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Abstract 
WEAKENING LOCAL POWER AND STRENGTHENING THE CENTRAL 
GOVERNMENT: WANG MANG’S SPATIAL ORGANIZATION REFORM IN THE XIN 
DYNASTY 
 
Shaobai Xiong, BPhil 
 
University of Pittsburgh, 2019 
 
 
 
 
The Xin dynasty (AD 9–AD 23) is an ephemeral dynasty between the Western Han dynasty 
(202 BC–AD 8) and the Eastern Han dynasty (AD 25–AD 220), and its founder, Wang Mang, was 
notorious in official historiography. But within the fifteen years that it lasted, a great number of 
reforms were launched by Wang Mang. Among these reforms, economic ones have always been 
a focus of the study of the Xin dynasty. However, reforms of spatial organization in the Xin have 
been overlooked and criticized. This study attempts to restore these neglected reforms through 
place name changes in the Xin dynasty, suggesting that these reforms were introduced to 
strengthen the power of the central government in response to rebellions and invasions, and 
contrary to the traditional interpretation on these reforms as symbolic and unnecessary, they were 
well-designed to address contemporary political and military crises.  
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1.0 Introduction 
 
Wang Mang 王莽 (45 BC–AD 23), who usurped the throne of the Western Han dynasty 
西漢 (202 BC–AD 8) and established the Xin dynasty 新朝 (AD 8–AD 23), has long been a 
notorious figure in official historiography. Wang Mang came from the powerful consort clan and 
gradually rose to power at the court. In AD 6, the infant emperor, Liu Ying, was crowned, and 
Wang Mang became the regent and appointed himself as the Acting Emperor (jiahuangdi 假皇帝
). Three years later, in AD 9, Wang Mang usurped the throne and established his own regime.1 At 
the end of the “Biography of Wang Mang” 王莽傳  of Hanshu 漢書 , which is the most 
comprehensive source about the Xin dynasty, historian Ban Gu 班固 (AD 32–AD 92) criticizes 
Wang Mang and his reforms that though Wang Mang’s deeds were even more disastrous than 
those of ancient tyrants, he confidently believed that he was the reincarnation of ancient sages.2 
Ban Gu’s negative evaluation was inevitably influenced by his standpoint as a loyalist of the 
Eastern Han dynasty, the successor of the Xin dynasty, that is naturally antagonistic to the Xin 
dynasty. Moreover, Ban Gu’s grandfather, once a respected statesman at the court, was 
 
1 Because there is a continuity of governing between Wang Mang’s regency (AD 6—AD 9) and the Xin 
dynasty, this study also includes spatial organization reforms launched during his regency.  
2 Ban Gu, Hanshu (Beijing: Chung Hwa Book Company, 1962), 4194. 
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marginalized by Wang Mang’s followers when Wang Mang became powerful in the court.3 Family 
history and personal opinion can lead to Ban Gu’s prejudice against Wang Mang. Unfortunately, 
his view influenced generations of official historiographers who generally described Wang Mang 
as an evil traitor and a failed revivalist dreaming of restoring ancient institutions recorded in 
Confucian Classics. 
Though Xin literally means “new” in Chinese, its foundation was built on the previous Han 
dynasty, which means that the Xin dynasty initially inherited the whole institution of Han. Except 
some regional insurgences, the switch of power from Han to Xin was generally peaceful. Almost 
all government officials on different levels accepted the authority of Wang Mang, and many 
influential intellectuals, even including members from the imperial family, believed that the 
Mandate of Heaven has transferred from Han to Xin.4 As soon as Wang Mang took the throne, he 
initiated a set of economic reforms, whic make him famous in history, including the redistribution 
of land, the abolition of slavery and tenantry and the introduction of a new currency system.5 There 
are debates on the rationality of Wang Mang’s economic reforms. Some scholars contended that 
his economic policies were just a way that enabled him to get popular approval, especially from 
 
3 Homer Dubs, "Wang Mang and His Economic Reforms," T'oung Pao, Second Series, 35, no. 4 (1940): 
220; Denis Twitchett and Michael Loewe, eds., The Cambridge History of China, vol.1, The Ch’in and Han Empires, 
221 BC-AD 220 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1986), 224. 
4 Twitchett, The Cambridge History of China, 2:230. 
5 Mark Lewis, The Early Chinese Empires: Qin and Han (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 2007), 23; Qian Mu 錢穆, Guoshi dagang 國史大綱 (Beijing: The Commercial Press, 
1991), 153; Lin Jianming 林劍鳴, Qinhan shi 秦漢史 (Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin Press, 2003), 623. 
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statesmen hoping to restore ancient institutions.6 However, some scholars pointed out that all of 
these reforms should be considered as pilot policies that aim to address land annexation and 
slavery, but because of the short life of the regime, they never had the chance to fully unfold or to 
evolve over time.7 
Wang Mang’s economic reforms have always been the focus of the study of the Xin 
dynasty. However, his reforms of spatial organization have been overlooked. Unlike modern 
scholars’ positive view of Wang Mang’s economic reforms, the evaluation of Wang Mang’s spatial 
organization reforms, to the extent that it has received scholarly attention, is typically negative. 
Their main argument is that these spatial organization reforms were usually symbolic and 
unnecessary.8 However, this study reveals that these spatial organization reforms were neither 
unnecessary nor symbolic as previous scholars argued, and these reforms were designed to 
consolidate power to the central government by weakening local power.  
Methodologically, this study is based on a database of counties and commanderies in the 
Han dynasty that was developed from the “Treatise on Geography” 地理志 of Hanshu, which is a 
 
6 Homer Dubs, "Wang Mang and His Economic Reforms," 264. 
7 Lin Jianming, Qinhan shi, 626; Qian Mu, Guoshi dagang, 153. 
8 In Hanshu, Ban Gu pointed out that Wang Mang changed place names so frequently that officials and 
people could not even remember them. See Ban Gu, Hanshu, 4137. Qian Mu argued that the reform on place names 
did not benefit the life of people and it even disturbed people’s lives. See Qian Mu, Qinhan shi 秦漢史 (Beijing: Joint 
Publishing Co., 2005), 325–6. Lin Jianming argued that changing names was symbolic, announcing the beginning of 
a prosperous new era, and that it also deceived people that the crisis in the Han dynasty has been resolved by the Xin 
dynasty. See Lin Jianming, Qinhan shi, 645. 
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chapter that records geographical information about each commandery-level entity, including 
commandery (jun 郡) and kingdom (guo 國), and its subordinate county-level entity, including 
county (xian 縣), marquisate (houguo 侯國), marches (dao 道), and estates (yi 邑). The spatial 
location of the commanderies and counties mostly comes from the China Historical GIS (CHGIS), 
developed by Harvard University and Fudan University 復旦大學. For places that are not included 
in CHGIS, other scholarly studies were referenced.9  
 
9 Hanshu dilizhi huishi 漢書地理志匯釋, edited by Zhou Zhenhe 周振鶴, is a great help for determining the 
rough location of administrative units not included in CHGIS. For each place mentioned in the “Treatise of 
Geography,” this book adds notes about its estimated location. Though the estimated location is usually expressed 
through its approximate distance from modern places, it is still useful for this kind of empire-wide study. See Zhou 
Zhenhe, ed., Hanshu dilizhi huishi (Hefei: Anhui Jiaoyu chubanshe, 2006). 
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2.0 The Context of Wang Mang’s Spatial Organization Reforms 
The first challenge that Wang Mang faced, both before and after his usurpation, was the 
complexity of the Han administrative system. The Xin dynasty was built on the foundation of the 
Han dynasty, which was an empire with an immense territory. Up to the reign of Emperor Cheng 
成帝  (51 BC–7 BC), the territory of Han was divided into 103 commandery-level entities, 
including eighty-four commanderies and nineteen kingdoms. Under these commanderies and 
kingdoms were more than one thousand county-level entities including counties, marquisates, 
marches, and estates. 
In order to manage its large territory, the Han empire established a huge bureaucratic 
system. Among local officials, the most prominent one was the commandery administrator 
(junshou 郡守) who was the leading official of the commandery and was appointed directly by the 
emperor.10 Within their own commandery, commandery administrators had great power for being 
responsible for both civilian and military affairs.11 The leading official at the county level was the 
county magistrate (ling/zhang 令/長) who was also appointed by the central government. Because 
 
10 In 148 BC, the title of commandery administrator was changed to grand administrator (taishou 太守). To 
keep consistency and avoid confusion, in the following paragraphs, the term commandery administrator is kept 
throughout this paper. 
11 Hans Bielenstein, The Bureaucracy of Han Times (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 93; 
Qian Mu argued that commandery administrators in the Han enjoyed a significant degree of autonomy, having 
similarities with feudal lords (zhuhou 諸侯) in the Zhou dynasty. See Qian Mu, Qinhan shi, 291. 
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the county is the lowest level in the administrative hierarchy of Han, the county magistrate had 
immense power within his territory for enforcing laws and policies ordered by the central 
government.12 
Because of the immense power of local power holders either on commandery-level or on 
county-level, it became imperative for Wang Mang to investigate their credibility, especially when 
some of them began to challenge his authority. In the second year of Wang Mang’s regency (AD 
7), Zhai Yi 翟義 , the administrator of Dong commandery 東郡 , initiated a rebellion. Zhai 
collaborated with Liu Xin 劉信, the Marquis of Yanxiang 嚴鄉侯, and proclaimed that Liu Xin 
should be the emperor. They sent edicts around commanderies and kingdoms, informing people 
that it was time for all local power to collaboratively execute Wang Mang on behalf of the 
heaven.13 The rebellion of Zhai Yi expanded across more than ten commanderies and kingdoms, 
assembling more than one hundred thousand rebels, but it was suppressed within a year. In 
response to Zhai Yi, two civilians, Zhao Peng 趙朋 and Huo Hong 霍鴻, led a revolt in Huaili 
county 槐里縣, a county close to the capital at Chang’an 長安. It too was suppressed in the 
following year (AD 8). However, to suppress these rebellions, Wang Mang ceded military power 
to other commandery administrators who led local armies to protect their territory.14  
The second challenge that Wang Mang had to address was the rebellions of once 
subordinate neighboring polities (see Figure 1). In AD 6, the first year of Wang Mang’s regency, 
 
12 Hans Bielenstein, The Bureaucracy of Han Times, 100. 
13 Ban Gu, Hanshu, 4087. 
14 Ban Gu, Hanshu, 4107. 
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the Qiang 羌, a group of nomadic people on the northwestern frontier, invaded Xihai commandery 
西海郡.15 Qiang chiefs took advantage of the political instability after Wang Mang’s becoming 
regent and reclaimed the land they had previously ceded to Han. Wang Mang dispatched troops to 
repel the invasion. The conflict did not last long, and in the next year, AD 7, the army successfully 
defeated the Qiang tribes. After the Xin dynasty was established, military affairs on the frontier 
became increasingly frequent (see Figure 1). The army of Xin had to fight in different regions from 
the north to the southwest. On the northern boundary, Xiongnu frequently crossed the Great Wall 
and invaded border towns of Xin. In the northeast, the army of Xin invaded Goguryeo in retaliation 
for its assassination of the commandery administrator of Liaoxi commandery 遼西郡. In the 
northwest, Qiang tribe kept assaulting border counties of Han. In the southwest, the Kingdom of 
Gouding 句町 revolted, and the army of Xin spent years fighting there until the downfall of Xin. 
In the Western Region (xiyu 西域), the state of Yanqi 焉耆 assassinated the Protectorate General 
(duhu 都護), which led to the military revenge of Xin. Wang Mang had to fully control the 
previous army of Han and transform it into a force faithful to him in order to fight on multiple-
fronts from the north to the southwest. 
 
15 Ban Gu, Hanshu, 4087. 
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Figure 1 The Map of Military Events of the Xin Dynasty Before 16 AD 16 
 
 
16 1: the revolt of the Marquis of Anzhong 安眾侯 in Wan 宛 (AD 6); 2: the revolt of Qiang in Xihai 
commandery (AD 6); 3: the revolt of Zhai Yi (AD 7); 4: the revolt in Huaili County (AD 7); 5: the revolt of the 
Marquis of Xuxiang 徐鄉侯 in Xuxiang Marquisate (AD 9); 6: the revolt in the Kingdom of Zhending 真定國 (AD 
9); 7: the invasion of Xiongnu (AD 10); 8~13: the army of the Xin dynasty fought against Xiongnu from six directions 
(AD 10); 14: the revolt of Gouding (AD 9—AD 21); 15: the revolt of Goguryeo (AD 12); 16: the revolt of Yanqi (AD 
13); 17: the revolt of natives in Yizhou 益州 (AD 14); 18: the army of Xin fought against Yanqi (AD 9). 
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3.0  Reforming the System of Ranks 
The system of ranks in the Han dynasty, with twenty grades, was generally inherited from 
the previous Qin 秦 dynasty. This kind of ranking system was firstly established by the reformer, 
Shang Yang 商鞅, to reward meritorious military officers who contributed to the expansion of the 
state of Qin. When the Han dynasty was founded after the downfall of Qin, this institution was 
inherited and a group of meritorious followers of Liu Bang 劉邦 became the first beneficiaries of 
this system.17 Generally, the system of ranks can be divided into higher ranks and lower ranks. 
Higher ranks are guannei hou 關內侯 and marquis (liehou 列侯). The two ranks are hereditary 
and are actually aristocrats who were able to keep their fiefdoms and collect revenues.18 The lower 
ranks are conferred to common people, so it is also called minjue 民爵. Each lower rank provides 
different kinds of prestige, like the exemption from taxation and corvee and the reduce of penalty 
after breaking the law.19 
However, the prestige of the system of ranks depreciated once the system no longer 
rewarded military accomplishments. Instead, after the middle of the Western Han, titles could be 
 
17 Michael Loewe, "The Orders of Aristocratic Rank of Han China," T'oung Pao, Second Series 48, 124. 
18 The difference between guannei hou and marquis is that guannei hou had no real fiefdom but allocated 
households but marquis had fiefdom. 
19 Zhu Shaohou 朱紹侯, Jungong juezhi yanjiu 军功爵制研究 (Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin Press, 1990), 
68. 
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purchased from the government, which provided merchants and landlords a channel to enhance 
their social status. With the exception of higher ranks, the system of ranks became a collection of 
vacant titles without any special prestige.20 But even the highest grade marquis was detached from 
its original principle when the candidacy of marquis was mainly determined by their relationship 
with the imperial family. Except meritorious officers or officials (gongchen hou 功臣侯), its other 
candidates were sons of kings (wangzi hou 王子侯) and family members of the imperial consorts 
(waiqienze hou 外戚恩澤侯).21 
An enfeoffment system is a way to organize a group of political followers who can 
participate in local affairs and connect their profits to their lands. The three military campaigns 
that transpired during Wang Mang’s regency became an opportunity to establish the system of 
ranks for the Xin dynasty. When the series of wars ended in AD 8, Wang Mang began to reward 
hundreds of exceptional officers with titles and fiefdoms according to their military 
accomplishments. He reinstituted the five-grade nobility system 五等爵制 of the Zhou dynasty: 
duke (gong 公), marquis (hou 侯), earl (bo 伯), viscount (zi 子), and baron (nan 男). Out of the 
five grades recorded in the classics, one additional less privileged grade, called subordinate 
(fucheng 附城), was designed. The biggest difference between the five-grade system of ranks and 
the twenty-grade system of ranks is that the latter one is a system of ranks for every free people 
within the empire but the former one is a nobility system that distinguished a group of high status 
 
20 Zhu Shaohou, Jungong juezhi kaolun 軍功爵制考論 (Beijing: The Commercial Press, 2008), 75; Michael 
Loewe, "The Orders of Aristocratic Rank of Han China," T'oung Pao, Second Series 48, 126. 
21 Michael Loewe, "The Orders of Aristocratic Rank of Han China," 125. 
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people from common people. The privileges of noblemen under the new system were identical to 
those of the aristocratic higher ranks in the Han system: all of them were given a fiefdom to rule 
like marquis in Han. The rank of subordinate is similar with guannei hou for having households to 
collect revenue but having no real fiefdoms.22 
Another system was designed to distinguish noblemen through the suffix of their titles: 
those who defended against the invasion of Qiang were given titles containing qiang 羌, those who 
suppressed the rebellion of Zhai Yi were given titles containing lu 虜, and those who engaged in 
the campaign against rebellions in Huaili were given titles containing wu 武. The suffix system 
provides important hints to restore the reform of the nobility system through place names.23 Some 
scholars have already noticed that in Hanshu, there were a lot of counties whose new names in the 
Xin dynasty contain characters like wu and lu, but they failed to connect that phenomenon with 
the rewarding of military officers. These scholars generally viewed that phenomenon from a 
rhetoric perspective. Wu in Chinese is related to war or a warrior and lu in Chinese means 
barbarians. Therefore, a kind of explanation is that the motivation of these name change is due to 
Wang Mang’s hostility to non-Han peoples, since these new place names usually transmit strong 
contempt for them, like yalu 厭虜 , which literally means “to suppress barbarians.” 24  That 
traditional perspective argues that because most of these counties were located on the frontier 
 
22 Ban Gu, Hanshu, 4128–9. 
23  Ban Gu, Hanshu, 4089. 
24 Cao Jinhua, “Wang Mang gaiyi diming zhi jiben guilu yu zhengzhi qingxiang 王莽改易地名之基本規
律與政治傾向,” Yangzhou shiyuan xuebao 揚州師院學報, no. 2 (1991): 120. 
12 
 
between Xiongnu and the Xin, these place names functioned to curse nomadic people in order to 
keep the boundary peaceful. 
However, these traditional interpretations neglected Wang Mang’s reform of the system of 
ranks and his design of the suffix system. These county-level entities were actually fiefdoms 
offered to meritorious military officers. Government seals confirm that speculation. Jigu guanyin 
kao 集古官印考 is a collection of existing government seals from the Han dynasty to the Yuan 
dynasty. For example, the imprint text of a seal, following the style of government seals in the Xin 
dynasty, is “The Household Minister of the Baron of Yongwu” (yongwu nan jiacheng 永武男家
丞).25 According to the “Treatise of Geography,” in Dingxiang commandery 定襄郡, a county that 
had been called Wugao 武皋 changed its name into Yongwu 永武. Combining the information 
from the seal and from the text, we can infer that in some conditions, when counties changed 
names, the nature of these places was also changed. These counties whose new names had wu as 
their suffix seem to have been transformed into fiefdoms and offered to meritorious officers (see 
Table 1). Since Hanshu only includes new place names without their suffix, previous scholars 
failed to connect the reforms on the system of ranks with name changes in the Xin dynasty.  
Another case confirms this speculation from another perspective. There are sixteen Han 
counties that contained the character wu, but in the Xin dynasty, the character wu in these counties’ 
names was transformed into huan 桓. For example, Yangwu county 陽武 got its new name, 
 
25 Qu Zhongrong 瞿中溶, Jigu guanyin kao 集古官印考, vol. 2, 2 juan 8. For more seals from the Xin 
dynasty recorded in Jigu guanyin kao, see Appendix A. 
13 
 
Yanghuan 陽桓, in Xin. One of the meanings of huan is “to be mighty,” which is a synonym of 
wu. In this way, counties whose names include wu in Han but were not fiefdoms in Xin, changed 
their name to avoid conflicts with the suffix system. 
Table 1 The Table of Seals Whose Imprint Text in Accordance with New County Names 
Imprint Text Name Change 
The Seal of the Household Minister of the Marquis of Mingyi 
明义侯家丞  
Liyang 历阳 to Mingyi 明义 
       The Seal of the Household Minister of the Baron of Yongwu 
       永武男家丞  
       Wugao 武皋 to Yongwu 永武 
       The Seal of the Heir of Zhanwu 
       展武世子印  
       Haiyan 海盐 to Zhanwu 展武 
There are many examples of Xin government seals, but not all of the place names on them 
can be found in Hanshu. This is explained by what we know of the compilation of the “Treatise of 
Geography.” Based on administrative documents compiled up to the third year of Yuanyan 元延
三年 (10 BC), the “Treatise of Geography” does not include entities which were created after that 
date.26 Ban Gu only comments on places whose predecessors existed earlier than the third year of 
Yuanyan. For example, the name change of Wugao county was recorded because it was established 
before the third year of Yuanyan. However, fiefdoms that were founded by separating some land 
 
26 Zhou Zhenhe, Xihan zhengqu dili 西漢政區地理 (Beijing: Renmin Press, 1987), 22. 
14 
 
from existing counties were not included in Hanshu for having no predecessors before 10 BC.27 
This explains why some Xin place names on government seals were not recorded in Hanshu. 
Wang Mang’s reform of the system of ranks began with military officers. When the dynasty 
was formally established, the range of beneficiaries expanded. In AD 9, Wang Mang offered titles 
and fiefs to his family members according to their closeness to his branch because relatives were 
his natural allies. Similarly, Wang Mang also designed a rule to distinguish the titles of his relatives. 
Titles, which contained mu 睦, were given to paternal family members, and titles, which contained 
long 隆, were given to maternal family members. In the “Treatise of Geography”, there were 
sixteen counties (though only eleven of them can be located) whose new names in the Xin dynasty 
incorporated mu. These can be linked to noble investiture by seals found in Jigu guanyin kao. 
 
27 Hou Xiangrong 后曉榮, “Xinmang zhijun kao 新莽置郡考,” Journal of Chinese Historical Studies 中國
史研究, no.2 (2013): 64. 
15 
 
 
Figure 2 The Map of Potential Fiefdoms in the Xin Dynasty28 
The record of name changes in the Xin dynasty from Hanshu reflects that Wang Mang 
strategically used enfeoffment to control peripheral territory of the empire. Comparing the 
distribution pattern of fiefdoms containing wu and lu with those conferred on Wang Mang’s kin, 
it is evident that fiefdoms containing wu and lu were usually placed on the geographical periphery 
of the empire (see Figure 2).29 The majority of them (69%) were located in border commanderies, 
 
28 The border and great wall in the Han dynasty referenced The Historical Atlas of China 中國歷史地圖集 
edited by Tan Qixiang 譚其驤. See Tan Qixiang, ed., The Historical Atlas of China, vol.2 (Beijing: Ditu Chubanshe, 
1982). 
29 Though there were seals of noblemen with titles containing qiang collected in Jigu guanyin kao, there was 
not any new names containing qiang in Hanshu. It is possible these fiefdoms were established by separating a portion 
of land from an existing county. 
16 
 
and some of them were close to important forts.30 But the spatial distribution pattern of fiefdoms 
of Wang Mang’s relatives was a bit different from that of military officers (see Figure 2). Some of 
these fiefdoms were located in Guandong 關東, the “ideal” area for marquisates in the Han 
dynasty. Guandong, which was one of the most prosperous areas with the highest population 
density and fertile lands in the empire, was also the most potentially rebellious region. Guandong 
refers to the area east of Hangu Pass 函谷關 and it used to be the territory of the six states during 
the Warring States 戰國 (475 BC–⁠221 BC). There was a dense network of relationships among 
multiple traditional powers like former aristocrats of the six states, commandery administrators, 
county magistrates, Han marquises, landlords, and powerful clans. Because of the intertwine of 
traditional powers there, in the beginning of the Han dynasty, the central government gave up 
seeking direct control over Guandong and established kingdoms to rule commanderies in 
Guandong. In early Western Han dynasty, the central government were anxious to protect the 
safety of Guanzhong 關中, the basin west of Hangu Pass that the central government located in, 
from potential insurrections from the east. A series of fords along the Yellow River and passes at 
strategic locations were built up. The government even issued the “Ordinances on Fords and 
Passes” (jin’guan ling 津關令) to strictly control the circulation of goods between Guanzhong and 
 
30 In the Han dynasty, commanderies were categorized into two types: border commanderies (bianjun 邊郡) 
and inner commanderies (neijun 內郡). Border commanderies differed from inner commanderies for their closeness 
to the border. Except administrative duties, administrators of border commanderies undertook more military duties in 
order to protect the border. See Du Xiaoyu 杜晓宇, “Shilun qinhan bianjun de gainian fanwei yu tezheng 試論秦漢“
邊郡”的概念、範圍與特征,” China’s Borderland History and Geography Studies 中國邊疆史地研究, no. 4 (2012): 
1–12. 
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Guandong. For instance, the transportation of horses, which can be used to equip cavalries, was 
prohibited exporting from Guanzhong to Guandong.31 Though the central government gradually 
reinforced its control over Guandong by dismembering kingdoms up to the end of Western Han, 
the central government was still wary of Guandong. For example, when an army comprised of 
soldiers from Guandong was dispatched to suppress the rebellion of Zhai Yi, officers from 
Guandong were replaced by those from Guanzhong.32 Therefore, the offering of lands to Wang 
Mang’s relatives in Guandong can be seen as an action to counterbalance local power there. 
However, some relatives of Wang Mang were given fiefdoms in the far south, the 
northeastern boundary, and the northwestern boundary. Those investitures may reflect similar 
motive with the investitures of military officers but the difference is that Wang Mang’s relatives 
were obviously more trustworthy than officers having no kinship relation with him. As the Grand 
Commandant of the Han, Wang Mang appointed many relatives to be military generals, and 
through a memorial in the end of AD 8, Wang Mang reflected his intention of dispatching his 
relatives to strategic locations to protect the safety of the capital. General Wang Ji 王級, the 
Marquis of Mingwei 明威侯33, was sent to the Pass of Raoliu 繞溜關 which was located in Qinling 
mountain 秦嶺 and controlled the road to the Basin of Nanyang 南陽盆地; General Wang Jia 王
嘉, the Marquis of Weimu 尉睦侯, was sent to the Pass of Yangtou 羊頭關 to defend potential 
 
31 Anthony Barbieri-Low and Robin Yates, Law, State, and Society in Early Imperial China (Leiden: Brill, 
2015), 1137; Liang Wanbin 梁萬斌, “Jin’guan ling yu hanchu zhi zhengzhi dili jiangou 《津關令》與漢初之政治
地理建構,” Fudan Journal (Social Sciences Edition), no. 2 (2016): 46–53. 
32 Ban Gu, Hanshu, 3427.  
33 The title of Wang Ji does not contain mu, possibly because he had owned the title through other merits 
earlier than being conferred as Wang Mang’s relative.  
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attacks from Xiongnu; General Wang Qi 王奇, the Marquis of Zhangwei 掌威侯, was sent to the 
Pass of Hangu to protect the capital from potential attack of the Guandong region; General Wang 
Fu 王福, the Baron of Huaiqiang 懷羌子, was sent to the region of Qianlong 汧隴 which shielded 
the capital from the invasion of Qiang.34  
In the Xin dynasty, lands for fiefdoms were selected after thorough consideration. Hanshu 
mentions that a group of specialists in geography and maps were enlisted to work collaboratively 
to select lands for fiefdoms. At the same time, Wang Mang also examined the group of specialists’ 
work with other high-ranking officials.35 This distribution pattern reveals Wang Mang’s multiple 
intentions. First, though these noblemen may not actually live in their fiefdoms–many of them 
stayed in the armies or at the court–the offering of peripheral land bound their profits with the 
prosperity of the periphery because they received revenue from their fiefdom. 36  Allocating 
aristocrats to the border encouraged them to play more active roles in frontier affairs.  
Second, including more military officers into the system of ranks helped Wang Mang to 
take control over the army. As mentioned before, in the Han dynasty, candidates for marquis were 
usually from three categories of people including meritorious officers. However, according to the 
“Table of Meritorious Officers” 功臣表 in Hanshu, there were only 205 officers rewarded within 
 
34 Ban Gu, Hanshu, 4116–7.  
35 Ban Gu, Hanshu, 4129. 
36 According to Hanshu, in the Xin dynasty, though each noblemen was nominally given a fiefdom, they did 
not get their land at once. Wang Mang claimed that because documents relating to households and land had not been 
officially confirmed, noblemen were suggested staying in the capital and they received money every month. See Ban 
Gu, Hanshu, 4129. 
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the more than one hundred years from the reign of Emperor Jing 景帝 (157 BC–141 BC) to that 
of Emperor Cheng (51 BC–7 BC), and only 118 of them had no titles before their investiture.37 
During the reign of Emperor Cheng, which immediately preceded Wang Mang’s regency, there 
were thirty people eligible to be included. Ten of them were from consort clans, and fifteen of 
them inherited their title from their fathers.38 Therefore, among the thirty meritorious officers in 
the reign of Emperor Cheng, only five of them had no titles before (see Table 2). By contrast, 
Wang Mang’s generous conferral of thousands of titles gave officers without a Han noble 
background a channel to enter the system of ranks and enjoy privileges identical to that of previous 
higher ranks.  
Table 2 The Table of the Social Background of Han Marquises Who Were Conferred According to Their 
Merit39 
      Background 
Reign 
Ordinary 
People 
Prince 
Consort 
Clan 
Inheritance Proportion of Ordinary People 
Jingdi 景帝 18 8 2 29 62.1% 
Wudi 武帝 75 / 9 89 84.3% 
Zhaodi 昭帝 8 / 6 15 53.3% 
Xuandi 宣帝 11 / 21 36 30.6% 
Yuandi 元帝 1 / 2 6 16.7% 
Cheng 成帝 5 / 10 30 16.7% 
 
37 Ban Gu, Hanshu, 636–75. 
38 Ban Gu, Hanshu, 675. 
39 The table was drawn according to the “Table of Meritorious Officers” in Hanshu. See Ban Gu, Hanshu, 
635–75. 
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Third, the spatial distribution pattern, which was totally counter to the tradition of Han, 
was probably due to economic considerations. In the Xin dynasty, only seven of the forty-eight 
fiefdoms were within these traditionally “ideal” regions for fiefdoms. The rest of them were in 
border commanderies or in the far south which had never been considered for the allocation of 
Han fiefs because of hard natural conditions. Since thousands of people were rewarded in the Xin 
reforms, it would have been impossible to give each one a county-sized territory or a divided 
portion of a county in a fertile region. By removing that territory from the tax rolls, that would 
have had an excessive negative effect on the revenue of the empire. 
Overall, the introduction of the Xin five-grade system of ranks destroyed the Han nominal 
twenty-grade system of ranks. The advantage of the new system was that it enabled more people 
without titles to acquire privileges identical to that of higher ranks in the previous system. The new 
system played an important role for Wang Mang to control the army not only by offering privileges 
to his relatives in the army but also by drawing officers with no aristocratic backgrounds to his 
side. Moreover, the distribution of fiefdoms was strategically designed to counterbalance local 
power in Guandong and to place noblemen in border commanderies and strategic locations in 
preparation for potential revolts and invasions. 
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4.0 Division of Administrative Units 
According to Hanshu, there were 103 commandery-level entities and 1578 county-level 
entities around the empire (10 BC).40 However, a memorial in AD 14 attested 125 commandery-
level entities and 2203 county-level entities. Their number grew rapidly in the Xin dynasty, which 
is the evidence that the division of administrative units was changed. However, the ratio of county-
level entities to commandery-level entities remained relatively consistent (from 15.4 to 17.6), it 
shows that the new division is not a structural change on the administrative system inherited from 
Han because in order to keep administrative efficiency, there should be an ideal ratio between a 
unit and its subordinate units, and the ratio will change greatly only when the system encounters a 
structural change that modifies the function of each level. Thus, the new division was more like 
an adjustment to the previous one. 
4.1 Counties 
County was the most basic unit of the Han administrative system. The division of a county-
level entity41 was usually determined by local population. Therefore, a county was a relatively 
 
40 County-level entities refers to all kinds of county-level administrative units (xian, houguo, dao, and yi) in 
the Han dynasty and the Xin dynasty. According to “Table of Nobility Ranks and Government Office 百官公卿表” 
from Hanshu, there were 1587 counties, which is nine more than the record of the “Treatise of Geography.” 
41 County-level entities refers to county-level administrative units (xian, houguo, dao, and yi) in the Han 
dynasty and the Xin dynasty. 
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stable unit based on regional economy. 42  Wang Mang established around five hundred new 
county-level entities around the empire.43 Such a dramatic increase reveals that the new division 
was probably not based on population and economy because there was no evidence that population 
increased rapidly in the end of the Han dynasty. According to the “Treatise of Geography,” eleven 
counties had new names which contained the characters ju 聚 and xiang 鄉 (see Table 3).  
Table 3 The Table of Counties Whose New Names Contained xiang or ju in the Xin Dynasty 
Previous Name New Name Previous Name of Superordinate Commandery (New Name) 
Li朸 Zhangxiang 張鄉 Pingyuan平原  (Heping河平) 
Gaowan 高宛 Changxiang 常鄉 Qiansheng千乘  (Jianxin 建信) 
Ping’an 平安  Duxiang 杜鄉 Guangling Kingdom 廣陵國  (Jiangping 江平) 
Shu 舒 Kunxiang 昆鄉  Lujiang 廬江  (Lujiang廬江) 
Tuling 荼陵  Shengxiang 聲鄉 Changsha Kingdom長沙國  (Tianman填蠻) 
Gaole 高樂 Weixiang 為鄉 Bohai 勃海  (Yinhe 迎河) 
Qiao 郻 Qinju 秦聚 Julu巨鹿  (Herong 和戎) 
Zhongqiu 中丘 Zhiju 直聚   Changshan 常山  (Jingguan井關) 
Hexiang 合鄉 Heju 合聚  Donghai 東海  (Yiping沂平) 
Jiancheng 建成 Duoju 多聚  Yuzhang 豫章  (Jiujiang 九江) 
Quanjing 狋氏 Quanju 狋聚 Dai 代  (Yadi厭狄) 
 
During the Han, ju and xiang were non-administrative settlements under counties. County-
level entities, whose names contained ju and xiang, were not only seen in the Xin dynasty. 
 
42 Zhou Zhenhe, Xihan zhengqu dili, 231. 
43 According to the preceding section of this paper, newly established fiefdoms also contributed to the 
increase in the number of county-level entities in the Xin dynasty. 
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However, this naming pattern was popular among marquisates in the Han dynasty, and it was 
resulted from the upgrading of settlements to form marquisates. In order to restrict the power of 
kings, Emperor Wu 武帝 (156 BC–87 BC) issued the “Order to Expand Favors” (tuien ling 推恩
令) that allowed kings to give part of their territories to their princes, and as when these princely 
fiefdoms were established, their lands ceased to be subordinate to kingdoms, and were moved 
instead to the supervision of neighboring commanderies. Initially, princes were usually given full-
size counties to build their fiefdoms, but after practicing the policy for several generations, 
kingdoms no longer had enough lands to offer. As a compromise, princely fiefdoms were created 
by separating single settlements from full-size counties. Nevertheless, though these princely 
fiefdoms were not established on the foundation of full-size counties, they were counted as county-
level entities.44 Sometimes, these princely fiefdoms inherited names of single settlements that they 
built upon and they can be identified according to characters, like ju and xiang, that their names 
contained. For example, there was a marquisate called Qixiang 祁鄉. Its predecessor was probably 
a settlement, called Qi 祁, that was affiliated to a county. In 15 BC, when the King of Liang 梁王 
decided to allocate a fiefdom for his prince, the settlement Qi was chosen.45 As the result, the 
settlement became a marquisate that was counted as a county-level entity. 
The similar pattern of name change suggests that separating some settlements from full-
size counties to form new and smaller counties may happen in the Xin dynasty, and the previous 
names of these settlements were kept. For example, according to the “Treatise of Geography,” Li 
 
44 Ma Menglong 馬孟龍, “Xihan houguo dili 西漢侯國地理” (PhD diss., Fudan University, 2011), 39. 
45 Ban Gu, Hanshu, 515. 
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county 朸縣 got its new name Zhangxiang 張鄉 in the Xin dynasty (see Figure 3). It is possible 
that Li was comprised of several settlements, including a settlement called Zhangxiang. In the Xin 
dynasty, these settlements were separated from Li and formed new counties. If Zhangxiang was 
not the only settlement that received independence from Li, why does Ban Gu note that Li was 
named after Zhangxiang rather than other subordinate settlements? There must be a kind of 
continuity between Li county and Zhangxiang: the new Zhangxiang county probably received the 
previous county seat, which makes it the successor of Li county.  
 
Figure 3 A Graphic Demonstration of the Possible Formation Process of Zhangxiang County 
A Xin seal entitled “the Seal of the Minister of Changju County 長聚則丞印,” offers an 
archaeological perspective that reinforces this speculation.46 The name Changju literally means 
“the settlement of Chang.” Among counties in the “Treatise of Geography,” there is no county 
called Changju, which means that it was newly established in the Xin dynasty, and it was not 
 
46 Qu Zhongrong, Jigu guanyin kao, vol. 2, 2 juan, 9. 
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considered as the successor of its previous superordinate county. Therefore, it had been a Han 
settlement under a county but was upgraded in the Xin dynasty. 
Xin county magistrates were mainly inherited from the Han dynasty. There was no 
evidence in Hanshu that Wang Mang massively replaced county magistrates who had served the 
Han dynasty with his followers. Though the central government had the power to appoint county 
magistrates, because of the large number of county magistrates around the empire and their 
immense power within their territory, it was difficult to investigate the faithfulness of each of them 
or to remove all of them from office, and any kind of such policy can shake the base of the empire. 
The expedient way was to restrict them. Separating counties reduced their territory and enabled 
the central government to appoint trusted officials who could supervise the behavior of their 
colleagues without taking the current county magistrates’ place.  
4.2 Commanderies 
4.2.1 Name Change Pattern that Reflects Seat Migration 
In the Xin dynasty, commandery seats usually have similar names with their superordinate 
commanderies. For example, the new name of Pei commandery 沛郡 was Wufu 吾符, and the 
name of its seat was changed from Xiang 相 to Wufuting 吾符亭 (for five examples, see Table 4; 
for all cases, see Appendix B).  
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Table 4 The Table of Five Examples of Han Commandery Seats That Shared Similar New Names with Their 
Superordinate Commanderies47 
Previous Name and New Name of Commandery Seat Previous Name and New Name of Commandery 
宜禄县 Yilu (赏都亭县 Shangduting) 汝南郡 Runan (赏都郡 Shangdu) 
相县 Xiang (吾符亭县 Wufuting) 沛郡 Pei (吾符郡 Wufu) 
谯县 Qiao (延成亭县 Yanchengting) 沛郡 Pei (延城郡 Yancheng) 
临邑县 Linyi (榖城亭县 Guchengting) 东郡 Dong (榖城郡 Gucheng) 
寿良县 Shouliang (寿良县 Shouliang) 东郡 Dong (寿良郡 Shouliang) 
Except Han commandery seats that shared similar new names with their superordinate 
commanderies, there were also some counties that were not commandery seats before but also had 
similar new names with their superordinate commandery or neighboring commandery. For 
example, Wei commandery 魏郡 got a new name Weicheng 魏城 in Xin, but its previous seat, Ye 
county 鄴縣, kept its name. However, another subordinate county, Yu coutny 虞縣, received a 
new name, Weichengting 魏城亭. This similarity in names might be the evidence of the migration 
of commandery seats. In this case, it is possible that the seat of Wei commandery migrated from 
Ye to Yu. However, it is unfortunate that Hanshu does not have any discussion about the migration 
of commandery seats in the Xin dynasty. There are forty-five such cases found (for five examples, 
see Table 5; for all forty-five cases, see Appendix C). 
 
47 Pay attention to the consistency between new name for the seat and new name for the commandery. 
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Table 5 The Table of Five Examples of Counties That Were Not Commandery Seats in Han but Shared 
Similar New Names with Their Superordinate or Neighboring Commanderies in Xin48 
Commandery’s 
Name in Han 
Commandery’s 
Name in Xin 
Previous Seat 
New Name of the 
Previous Seat 
New Seat 
New Name of the 
New Seat 
河間國  
Hejian 
朔定郡 
 Shuoding 
樂成縣  
Lecheng 
陸信縣  
Luxin 
觀津縣  
Guanjin 
朔定亭縣  
Shuoding 
淮陽國  
Huaiyang 
新平郡  
Xinping 
陳縣  
Chen 
陳陵縣  
Chenling 
新平縣  
Xinping 
新平縣  
Xinping 
千乘郡  
Qiansheng 
建信郡  
Jianxin 
千乘縣  
Qiansheng 
千乘縣  
Qiansheng 
建信縣  
Jianxin 
建信縣  
Jianxin 
東萊郡  
Donglai 
東萊郡  
Donglai 
掖縣  
Ye 
掖通縣  
Yetong 
當利縣  
Dangli 
東萊亭縣  
Donglaiting 
勃海郡  
Bohai 
迎河郡  
Yinghe 
浮陽縣  
Fuyang 
浮城縣  
Fucheng 
南皮縣  
Nanpi 
迎河亭縣  
Yingheting 
4.2.2 New Division of Border Commanderies 
By comparing Figure 1 and Figure 4, it is evident that on the border, commandery seat 
migration was mainly determined by military affairs. On the northern border, many commandery 
seats retreated from the front, which might be the result of military conflicts with Xiongnu. In the 
northwest, the seat of Jiuquan commandery 酒泉郡  moved westwards. Located in the Hexi 
Corridor 河西走廊, Jiuquan was a key place that connected the major part of the empire to the 
Western Region. The Xin dynasty had conflicts with states in the Western Region beginning in 
 
48 Pay attention to commandery’s name in the Xin and new name of the new seat. 
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AD 13, when the state of Yanqi 焉耆 revolted and assassinated the Protectorate General of the 
Western Region. In AD 16, the army of Xin marched west, and though the main force was defeated 
by Yanqi, the rest of the army retreated and stayed in the state of Qiuci 龜茲 until the downfall of 
Xin, maintaining a military presence in the Western Region. 49  Moving the seat of Jiuquan 
commandery westwards can help to coordinate military operations and mobilize resources. 
 
Figure 4 The Map of Commandery Seat Migration in the Xin Dynasty 
In the northeast, Xin was seemingly more advantageous to Goguryeo for killing its chief 
Zou 騶 in AD 12. However, the migration pattern for seats of two northeastern commanderies 
reflects that the Xin dynasty adopted a more conservative strategy in this region: the seat of Xuantu 
 
49 Ban Gu, Hanshu, 3927. 
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commandery 玄菟郡 migrated southward, but the seat of Lelang commandery 樂浪郡 moved 
northward. Lelang commandery was located further south than Xuantu commandery and was in 
charge of governing population in the northern part of the Korean peninsula. However, after this 
migration, its seat was moved to the frontier between Goguryeo and Xin, parallel with the new 
seat of Xuantu commandery. It seems that the migration aimed to block the southward expansion 
of Goguryeo (see Figure 5). The new strategy sought to maintain the existing frontier between 
Goguryeo and the Xin rather than to effectively place all local population under the household 
registration system (bianhu 編戶) as what the Han dynasty did.50 This speculation can be proved 
through Hanshu. After the death of the chief of Goguryeo, the conflicts between Xin and Goguryeo 
did not come to an end. However, Goguryeo initiated more raids on border commanderies of Xin.51 
Facing this situation, the empire had to reorganize its northeastern commanderies to defend its 
border towns. 
 
50 Li Dalong 李大龍, “Cong Goguryeo xian dao andong duhufu: Goguryeo he lidai zhognyang wangchao 
guanxi 從高句驪縣到安東都護府: 高句驪和歷代中央王朝關係,” Etho-National Studies 民族研究, no.4 (1998): 
75. 
51 Ban Gu, Hanshu, 4130. 
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Figure 5 The Map of the Migration of Seats of Northeastern Commanderies 
In the southwest, near the Kingdom of Gouding, the seat of Zangke commandery 牂牁郡 
migrated forward to the frontier in order to coordinate the warfare against Gouding. Gouding was  
a kingdom among the southwestern barbarians (xinan yi 西南夷). The founder of Gouding, Wubo 
亡波, was conferred the title of king in 86 BC for helping the Han empire to suppress a rebellion 
in Yizhou Commandery 益州郡 whose territory was newly acquired in 109 BC, after conquering 
the Kingdom of Dian 滇国.52 Before the conquering of southwestern barbarians, Dian and Yelang 
夜郎 were the most important kingdoms in this region. Spatially, Gouding is between the two 
 
52 Ban Gu, Hanshu, 3843. 
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kingdoms and after the downfall of Dian, it began to challenge the power of Yelang.53 In 27 BC, 
the rebellion initiated by Yelang was suppressed and the Kingdom of Yelang was conquered.54 
The expansion of Han empire cleared two traditionally powerful kingdoms in the southwest, which 
gave Gouding the chance to rise. In AD 9, when the Xin dynasty was formally established, Wang 
Mang demoted the title of the king of Gouding to marquis, which led to his revolt. The war against 
Gouding became endless that continued until the downfall of the Xin dynasty.55  
According to the name change pattern, the seat of Zangke commandery was moved from 
Guqielan 故且蘭 county to Yelang 夜郎 county which used to be the capital of the conquered 
Yelang. The travel cost map suggests that the cost to move from Gouding to Guqielan was 
extremely high but the cost to move from Gouding to Yelang was far lower (see Figure 6) . The 
least-cost path between Guqielan and Gouding was also generated, and it shows that Yelang was 
midway between the two places. As the previous commandery seat, Guqielan has been under the 
control of Han empire since 111 BC but the cost of dispatching troops and sending goods from 
there to the front became extremely high. The midway position of Yelang provided better 
communication with the frontier and lower logistics cost to send supplies. 
 
53 Ban Gu, Hanshu, 3843-3845. 
54 Ban Gu, Hanshu, 3845, 1310. 
55 The war had many stages. The first stage started from AD 9 to AD 16. After seven years of failures, 
previous general was demoted and new generals were promoted. The second stage is from AD 16 to AD 21. The 
second stage had some victories but none of them are decisive. In AD 21, reinforcements were dispatched but it did 
not change the situation there. There were no records in Hanshu after this reinforcement, which shows that the long-
term war probably began to come to an end when empire-wide rebellions drained the military power of the Xin 
dynasty. 
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Figure 6 The Cost-Distance Map (Gouding as the Source Point) and a Least Cost Path Between Gouding and 
Guqielan 
4.2.3 New Division of Inner Commanderies 
The division of inner commanderies is completely different from that of border 
commanderies. For inner commanderies, except migrating commandery seats, establishing new 
commanderies is another strategy that was commonly used. In the Xin dynasty, the number of 
commanderies increased from 103 to 125 according to Hanshu. Though these newly established 
commanderies were not recorded in the “Treatise of Geography,” twenty-five new commanderies 
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can be restored through existing government seals and other paragraphs of Hanshu.56 Among these 
commanderies, only five of them were in the territory of border commanderies, which suggests 
that establishing new commanderies was mainly practiced in inner commanderies.  
Guandong is highly representative of the purpose of the division of inner commanderies in 
the Xin dynasty. Heatmaps generated from the location of commanderies in both regimes suggest 
that Guandong was always the region with the highest density of commanderies (see Figure 7 and 
Figure 8). Moreover, there were always two core regions in Guandong with the highest density of 
commanderies. The western core was located in the area north of the Yellow River 黃河 and east 
of the Taihang Mountain Range 太行山脈, and the eastern core was located north of the Taiyi 
Mountain Range 泰沂山脈. However, contour lines generated by heatmaps show that though the 
dual-core structure remained in the Xin dynasty, the essence of the structure changed greatly. First, 
the density of commanderies in Guandong in the Xin was actually twice more than that in the Han 
dynasty. Contour lines for both maps had the same interval, and therefore, the area with more 
contour lines is quantitatively higher in density. Second, contour lines in the Xin is much more 
compact than that in the Han, which suggests that the two core regions became much more 
prominent than the periphery, in terms of the density of commanderies.  
 
56 Hou Xiangrong, “Xinmang zhijun kao,” 64–73. Hou Xiaorong found 25 new commanderies, but according 
to Hanshu, up to AD 14, there were 125 commanderies around the empire, which means that from the end of the Han 
dynasty to AD 14, there were 22 new commanderies. Hou Xiaorong claimed that if the three capital commanderies 
(sanfu 三輔) were not counted, the number fits the record of Hanshu. 
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Figure 7 The Heatmap Generated from the Location of Commanderies in the Han Dynasty 
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Figure 8 The Heatmap Generated from the Location of Commanderies in the Xin Dynasty 
Multiple factors led to increase in the density of commanderies in Guandong. The 
establishment of new commanderies is the primary reason: five new commanderies were 
established in the western core region, and two new ones were in the eastern core region.57 There 
were totally eleven new commanderies established in Guandong. Second, many commandery seats 
in Guandong migrated close to each other and formed many clusters (see Figure 9). As the result, 
the average of distance between the seat of each commandery and that of its nearest neighbor 
 
57 The five commanderies in the western core are: Gucheng 榖城, Shouliang 壽良, Wenyang 汶陽, Wuyan 
無鹽, and Hecheng 和成. The two commanderies in the eastern core are: Yanting 延亭 and Jiping 冀平. 
36 
 
reduced from 99.6 km to 57.8 km. Third, many kingdoms used to be in Guandong, and in AD 9, 
kings of Han were required to hand over their land and seals to the central government.58 Though 
Hanshu does not mention the treatment of previous kingdoms, because most kingdoms had new 
names in the Xin dynasty, they were certainly transformed into commanderies.  
 
Figure 9 The Map of Clusters of Commanderies 
The new division aimed to weaken local power by breaking local power holder’s sphere of 
influence formed in the Han dynasty. Different from the migration of border commandery seats, 
 
58 Ban Gu, Hanshu, 4118. 
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which was mainly determined by the fluctuating frontier, the migration of inner commandery seats 
was connected with territorial changes. Among the forty-five migrated commandery seats, five of 
them were in the territory of their previous neighboring commanderies, which shows that territorial 
changes also happened while the migration of seats.59 Combined with the establishment of new 
commanderies, commandery boundary was reset, and the territory of each commandery was 
reduced, which prevented former Han commandery administrators bringing their power and 
personal social networks developed in the Han dynasty to the Xin dynasty. Moreover, the seats 
were placed close to each other to encourage mutual supervision between commandery 
administrators.  
The reason why Guandong endured some many changes in the division of commanderies 
is due to its potential of revolt. Many rebellions during the Xin dynasty happened there. Cluster D 
was the center of the western core region (see Figure 9). The extremely high density was due to 
the four new commanderies established there. The area that Cluster D located used to be the 
territory of the kingdom of Dongping 東平國, Shanyang commandery 山陽郡, Dong commandery, 
the kingdom of Lu 魯國, and Taishan commandery 泰山郡. This is the region that entangled 
deeply in the revolt of Zhai Yi, and many local people and aristocrats participated in the revolt. 
For example, Liu Xin and Liu Huang 劉璜, the two marquises that revolted together with Zhai Yi, 
were sons of the king of Dongping.60 Climate factors also promoted Guandong’s potential of revolt. 
 
59 Though the proportion of such case (11%) is not prominent, it is still representative. They were extreme 
cases. Counties in the periphery were usually traded off, but the establishment of seats on newly acquired land shows 
that the previous boundary was completely destroyed. 
60 Ban Gu, Hanshu, 3426–7. 
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In AD 11, a dike breach happened in Wei commandery and influenced commanderies in the lower 
reach of Yellow River. In the same year, commanderies by the Yellow River also suffered from a 
plague of locusts.61 Another major flood in the Xin dynasty happened in AD 14–17. This flood 
nearly destroyed the lower reaches of Yellow River, and worse than that, archaeological evidence 
suggests that the flood happened at the end of the growing season of crops, leading to massive 
starvation.62 Traditional political instability and devastating natural disasters collaboratively led to 
the extensive new division of commanderies in this area. 
 
61 Ban Gu, Hanshu, 4127. 
62 Tristram Kidder, “ New Perspectives on the Collapse and Regeneration of the Han Dynasty,” in Beyond 
Collapse: Archaeological Perspectives on Resilience, Revitalization, and Transformation in Complex Societies, Vol. 
no. 42, ed. Ronald K. Faulseit (Carbonade: Southern Illinois University Press, 2016), 83-84.. 
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5.0 Conclusion 
The reexamination of “The Treatise of Geography” of Hanshu has shown that the spatial 
organization reform in the Xin dynasty were neither symbolic nor unnecessary as previous scholars 
argued. However, it is Wang Mang’s reaction to challenges that he faced before and after his 
usurpation. The twenty-grade system of ranks of Han was replaced by a much attractive five-grade 
nobility system, and the conferring of land and title to meritorious officers transformed the army 
of Han into the army of Xin. Moreover, placing relatives to strategic locations to build their 
fiefdoms ensured the safety of the empire. After grouping followers through the system of ranks, 
Wang Mang ordered the new division of commanderies and counties, aiming to restrict local 
administrators’ power in inner commanderies and to better coordinate military operations in border 
commanderies. 
In Crisis and Conflict in Han China, 104 BC to AD 9, Michael Loewe suggested that during 
the Western Han, there were two conflicting streams of political attitude. One is the Modernist 
idea that formed during the reign of Emperor Wu. The other one is the Reformist idea that began 
in the reign of Emperor Zhao and further developed in the reign of Emperor Xuan. The influence 
of Modernists was gradually replaced by Reformists, and up to the end of Western Han, Reformists 
became dominant at the court. According to Loewe, Modernists were more concerned with 
addressing problems of the contemporary world but the Reformists wished to return to conditions 
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which they believed to have existed in the remote past.63 As the result, the modernists supported 
unrestricted ownership of land, the government monopolies of salt and iron and an expansionist 
foreign policy. However, the reformists supported political thoughts of Confucius and Mencius, 
treated omens as the sign of supernatural force and wished to revive institution of the Zhou 
dynasty. Obviously, on the surface, Wang Mang was a Reformist who ardently used omens to 
demonstrate the switch of Mandate of Heaven from Han to Xin and reinstituted the Nine Squares 
Landownership System (jingtianzhi 井田製) and the five-grade system of ranks from the Zhou 
dynasty. Based on this, Loewe argued that by introducing his Reformist plan, Wang Mang wanted 
to attract all sections of the community, especially Reformist statesmen.64 Nevertheless, Loewe 
also noticed that some of Wang Mang’s actions did not follow the pattern of Reformists like his 
extremely aggressive foreign policy that perfectly resembles that in the reign of Emperor Wu, 
which makes his real political attitude difficult to comprehend.65 
This study on Wang Mang’s spatial organization reforms has shown that Wang Mang was 
never a true Reformist but a Modernist. He skillfully strengthened his governing through reforms, 
and actually, similar policies repetitively appeared in history. Throughout Chinese history, Wang 
Mang not the only usurper, and some other famous usurpers are Cao Pi 曹丕 who established the 
regime of Wei (AD 213–AD 265) 魏 and Sima Yan 司馬炎 who founded the Western Jin dynasty 
(AD 265–AD 316) 西晉. Surprisingly, all of them launched reforms on the system of nobility. By 
 
63 Michael Loewe, Crisis and Conflict in Han China, 104 B. C. to A. D. 9 (London: Allen & Unwin, 1974), 
11. 
64 Michael Loewe, Crisis and Conflict in Han China, 104 B. C. to A. D. 9, 295. 
65 Michael Loewe, Crisis and Conflict in Han China, 104 B. C. to A. D. 9, 298. 
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the end of Eastern Han, The father of Cao Pi, Cao Cao 曹操, introduced the four-grade-system of 
nobility to replace that of Eastern Han, and many beneficiaries were meritorious officers. By the 
end of Wei, the father of Sima Yan, Sima Zhao 司馬昭, developed a five-grade-system of nobility 
replacing that of Wei.66 Moreover, separating land from a unit to weaken it is also not new in 
history. The “Order to Expand Favors” that separated kingdoms into marquisates was designed by 
Zhufu Yan 主父偃 in the reign of Emperor Wu. Reflected from the migration of commandery 
seats and the establishment of new commanderies was the massive redivision of commandery 
borders, and the idea behind it was always one of the leading considerations for an ancient Chinese 
regime while setting up administrative divisions, which is to use arbitrarily divided border rather 
than natural border to restrict the growth of regional power. 
The motive of Wang Mang’s spatial organization reform was practical and his seemingly 
unique polices were actually not new in history. However, it does not save his regime that fell 
within only fifteen years. Therefore, the downfall of the Xin dynasty is probably not due to the 
failure of politics but the misfortune of Wang Mang who had to face the devastating effects of the 
huge flooding of Yellow River in his reign. 
 
 
 
 
 
66 Lu Li 魯力, “Caowei jueji ji shouyu qingkuang tantao 曹魏爵級及授予情況探討,” Wuhan University 
Journal (Humanity Science), no.4 (2012): 68. 
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Appendix A  
 
Appendix Table 1The Table of Xin Seals in Jiguguanyinkao 
Imprint Text Location Traceable Note 
The Household Minister of the 
Marquis of Mingyi  
明义侯家丞 
√ Liyang county was called Mingyi 
county in Xin 
The Household Minister of the 
Viscount of Duomu  
多睦子家丞 
 
Relative 
The Household Minister of the 
Viscount of Tiaomu 条睦子家丞 
 
Relative 
The Household Minister of the 
Viscount of Shangfu上符子家丞 
√ Reporting Omens 
The Household Minister of the 
Viscount of Jinfu  
进符子家丞 
√ Reporting Omens 
The Household Minister of the 
Viscount of Juwu  
举武子家丞 
 
Meritorious officer participated in 
the campaign in Huaili county. 
The Household Minister of the 
Baron of Yongmu  
雝睦男家丞 
 
Relative 
The Household Minister of the 
Baron of Jiuwu  
就武男家丞 
 
Meritorious officer participated in 
the campaign in Huaili county. 
The Household Minister of the 
Baron of Xiweimu  
喜威睦男家丞 
 
Relative 
The Household Minister of the 
Baron of Yongwu  
永武男家丞 
√ Wugao county was called Yongwu 
in Xin 
The Seal of the Heir of Zhanwu  
展武世子印 
 
Haiyan county was called Zhanwu 
in Xin. 
The Seal of the Minister of Changju 
长聚则丞印 
 
Probably an upgraded settlement. 
The Seal of the Minister of Cavalry 
Wang Shen of Huaizhi County  
槐治县骑司马丞王审之印信 
√ Huaili county was called Huaizhi in 
Xin. 
The Seal of the Yutan King of Yue 
in Xin  
新越余坛君  
  
The Seal of the Sanyang King of 
Yue in Xin  
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新越三阳君印 
The Grand Administrator of 
Shouxiang Commandery 
受降大尉丞 
√ 
 
The Foremost Commandant of 
Lelang Commandery  
乐浪前尉丞 
√ 
 
The Commandant Over Agriculture 
of Huoxiang Commandery  
获降农中候 
√ 
 
The Minister of Jiuduting County  
就都亭宰印 
√ 
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Appendix B  
Appendix Table 2 The Table of Kept Commandery Seats in the Xin Dynasty 
Previous Name and New Name of 
Commandery Seat 
Previous Name and New Name of 
Commandery 
宜禄县 Yilu (赏都亭县 Shangduting) 汝南郡 Runan (赏都郡 Shangdu) 
相县 Xiang (吾符亭县 Wufuting) 沛郡 Pei (吾符郡 Wufu) 
谯县 Qiao (延成亭县 Yanchengting) 沛郡 Pei (延城郡 Yancheng) 
临邑县 Linyi (榖城亭县 Guchengting) 东郡 Dong (榖城郡 Gucheng) 
寿良县 Shouliang (寿良县 Shouliang) 东郡 Dong (寿良郡 Shouliang) 
寿光县 Shouguang (翼平亭县 Yipingting) 北海郡 Beihai (翼平郡 Yiping) 
不夜县 Buye (夙夜县 Suye) 东莱郡 Donglai (夙夜郡 Suye) 
莒县 Ju (莒陵县 Juling) 城阳国 Chengyang (莒陵郡 Juling) 
梓潼县 Zitong (子同县 Zitong) 广汉郡 Guanghan (子同郡 Zitong) 
成都县 Chengdu (成都县 Chengdu) 蜀郡 Shu (成都郡 Chengdu) 
无盐县 Wuyan (有盐亭县 Youyanting) 东平国 Dongping (有盐郡 Youyan) 
湿沃县 Shiwo (延亭县 Yanting) 千乘郡 Qiansheng (延亭郡 Yanting) 
增山县 Zengshan (增山县 Zengshan) 西河郡 Xihe (增山郡 Zhengshan) 
广都县 Guangdu (就都亭县 Jiuduting) 广汉郡 Guanghan (就都郡 Jiudu) 
敦煌县 Dunhuang (敦德县 Dunde) 敦煌郡 Dunhuang (敦德郡 Dunde) 
灵武县 Lingwu (威成亭县 Wuchengting) 北地郡 Beidi (威成郡 Weicheng) 
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Appendix C  
Appendix Table 3 The Table of Migrated Commandery Seats in the Xin Dynasty 
Han County Name Xin County Name Han Commandery Xin Commandery 
女阴县 汝坟县 汝南郡 汝坟郡 
虞县 陈定亭县 梁国 陈定郡 
魏县 魏城亭县 魏郡 魏城郡 
广年县 富昌县 广平国 富昌郡 
上曲阳县 常山亭县 常山郡 井关郡 
观津县 朔定亭县 信都国 新博郡 
巨野县 巨野县 山阳郡 巨野郡 
新平县 新平县 淮阳国 新平郡 
鬲县 河平亭县 平原郡 河平郡 
建信县 建信县 千乘郡 建信郡 
富平侯国 乐安亭县 平原郡 河平郡 
般阳县 济南亭县 济南郡 乐安郡 
当利县 东莱亭县 东莱郡 东莱郡 
郁秩县 郁秩县 胶东国 郁秩郡 
襄垣县 上党亭县 上党郡 上党郡 
武垣县 垣翰亭县 涿郡 垣翰郡 
泗阳县 淮平亭县 泗水国 水顺郡 
襄安县 庐江亭县 庐江郡 庐江郡 
曲阳侯国 延平亭县 九江郡 延平郡 
上虞县 会稽县 会稽郡 会稽郡 
柴桑县 九江亭县 豫章郡 九江郡 
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安风县 安风亭县 六安国 安风郡 
武原县 和乐亭县 楚国 和乐郡 
编县 南顺县 南郡 南顺郡 
州陵县 江夏县 南郡 南顺郡 
南平县 南平县 桂阳郡 南平郡 
义陵县 建平县 武陵郡 建平郡 
营道县 九疑亭县 零陵郡 九疑郡 
夜郎县 同亭县 牂柯郡 同亭郡 
河池县 乐平亭县 武都郡 乐平郡 
戎邑道 填戎亭县 天水郡 填戎郡 
张掖县 张掖县 武威郡 张掖郡 
玉门县 辅平亭县 酒泉郡 辅平郡 
埒县 填狄亭县 雁门郡 填狄郡 
代县 厌狄亭县 代郡 厌狄郡 
渠搜县 沟搜县 朔方郡 沟搜郡 
南皮县 迎河亭县 勃海郡 迎河郡 
夷舆县 朔调亭县 上谷郡 朔调郡 
路县 通路亭县 渔阳郡 通路郡 
徐无县 北顺亭县 右北平郡 北顺郡 
西盖马县 玄菟亭县 玄菟郡 玄菟郡 
浿水县 乐鲜亭县 乐浪郡 乐鲜郡 
揭阳县 南海亭县 南海郡 南海郡 
无编县 九真亭县 九真郡 九真郡 
西捲县 日南亭县 日南郡 日南郡 
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